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THE DEVIOUS DEBTOR: 11 U.S.C. § 523(A)(2)(B)
AND THE NEED FOR A MORE EQUITABLE
OUTCOME
ABSTRACT
Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits debtors from
discharging debts for money, property, services, or credit obtained by false
pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud other than a statement
respecting the debtor’s financial condition. Under § 523(a)(2)(B), if those
debts are obtained by a statement respecting the debtor’s financial
condition, then the statement must be in writing for the debt to be
discharged. A conflict among the circuit courts arose as to whether a
statement about a single asset can be a statement respecting the debtor’s
financial condition. The majority of the courts applied a narrow
interpretation to the phrase whereas the minority of courts followed a
broad interpretation. In Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, the
United States Supreme Court was presented with the opportunity to resolve
the dispute and, agreeing with the broad interpretation, held that a
statement regarding a single asset may be a statement respecting the
debtor’s financial condition. This Note argues that although the broad
interpretation is correct when considering only the text and legislative
history of the Bankruptcy Code, its application will lead to unfavorable
consequences. Therefore, this Note suggests that the Supreme Court should
consider the totality of the circumstances, specifically: (1) the sufficiency
and intent of the debtor’s oral statements; (2) the amount of money a
creditor is owed; and (3) the sophistication of the parties.
INTRODUCTION
Federal bankruptcy law is covered by Title 11 of the United States
Code, also known as the Bankruptcy Code. 1 The Bankruptcy Code governs
how debtors may discharge their debts. 2 Section 523 of the Bankruptcy
Code lists debts that are not dischargeable. 3 Courts have grappled with the
proper interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B). 4 The courts
diverged on whether a debtor’s statement about a single asset can be “a
statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition.” 5 The implication
being, if the statement is found to respect the debtor’s financial condition,
then the statement must be in writing for the debt to be discharged. 6 The
1. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2012).
2. See Bankruptcy: Overview, Practical Law Practice Note 1-380-9908, WESTLAW (last

visited Nov. 15, 2018) [hereinafter Practical Law].
3. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2012).
4. See In re Appling, 848 F.3d 953, 957 (11th Cir. 2017).
5. See id. at 953.
6. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2012).
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majority of courts, including the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, followed
a narrow interpretation of the statute, 7 whereas the Fourth Circuit adhered
to a broader interpretation. 8 The Eleventh Circuit’s 2017 decision in In re
Appling adopted the broad approach and further divided the courts. 9
It was clear that a consistent rule across the circuit courts was needed to
ensure uniformity in applying the statute. Resolution ultimately came when
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the In re Appling
case. On June 4, 2018, the Supreme Court, in Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP
v. Appling, resolved the circuit split in a unanimous decision that affirmed
the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion: a statement regarding a specific asset can
be a “statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition” under §
523(a)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code. 10
The Supreme Court’s decision clarifies that the broad application is the
correct interpretation of the phrase, “a statement respecting the debtor’s
financial condition,” when considering only its statutory language and
legislative history. The opinion, however, reveals that the Supreme Court
favors dishonest debtors over honest creditors. Congress should modify the
Bankruptcy Code to allow for a more equitable solution. Part I of this Note
will discuss the background of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B); Part II
will discuss the circuit split; Part III will discuss the Supreme Court’s
decision in In re Appling; Part IV will argue that the broad interpretation is
proper, but the consequences of its application are flawed; and Part V will
offer a more equitable solution, which is that exceptions to discharge should
be determined on a case-by-case basis by considering the totality of the
circumstances.
I. BACKGROUND
A. THE U.S. BANKRUPTCY CODE
“The Bankruptcy Code gives a debtor a fresh start by permitting him to
discharge his pre-existing debts.” 11 In other words, filing for bankruptcy
provides an individual or entity with the opportunity to discard or make a
plan to repay debts. 12 The Bankruptcy Code is divided into chapters that
deal with different types of bankruptcy cases such as reorganization and
liquidation. 13 Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code relates to the creditors, the

7. See In re Bandi, 683 F.3d 671, 676 (5th Cir. 2012); see also In re Lauer, 371 F.3d 406,
413–14 (8th Cir. 2004); In re Joelson, 427 F.3d 700, 706 (10th Cir. 2005).
8. See Engler v. Van Steinburg, 744 F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir. 1984).
9. See In re Appling, 848 F.3d at 960.
10. Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 138 S. Ct. 1752, 1764 (2018).
11. In re Appling, 848 F.3d at 956.
12. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Services & Forms: Bankruptcy, http://www.usco
urts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy (last visited Oct. 21, 2018).
13. See Practical Law, supra note 2.
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debtors, and the estate; Section 523, within Chapter 5, includes the
exceptions to discharge. 14
Black’s Law Dictionary defines discharge as “the release of a debtor
from monetary obligations upon adjudication of bankruptcy.” 15 A debtor
has no legal obligation to pay the debts that are discharged, and, as a result,
its creditor is prohibited from taking action to collect debt that is
discharged. 16 Debts that are not discharged require the debtor to repay those
debts after bankruptcy. 17 Under § 523(a)(2), there are two exceptions to
discharge: debt is not dischargeable for money, property, services, or an
extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, if it was obtained by “(A) false
pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement
respecting the debtor’s financial condition; or (B) use of a statement in
writing (i) that is materially false; (ii) respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s
financial condition; (iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable
for such money, property, services, or credit reasonably relied; and (iv) that
the debtor caused to be made or published with intent to deceive.” 18 In sum,
subsection A consists of fraud derived from either oral or written statements
that does not concern a debtor’s financial condition, and subsection B
involves materially false written statements respecting the debtor’s financial
condition. Consequently, debts arising from oral misrepresentations
respecting a debtor’s financial condition are dischargeable.19
The exceptions to discharge serve two purposes. 20 First, public policy
requires the repayment of certain debts, including, but not limited to, taxes
or customs duties, alimony and child support payments, fines, penalties or
forfeitures to the government, educational loans made by the government or
a nonprofit institution, and court fees. 21 Second, the exceptions provide
recognition for the type of fault that caused the debt. For example, the
exceptions include debts generated by money, goods or services obtained
by fraud, falsehood, or willful and malicious injury. 22
B. 11 U.S.C. § 523(A)(2)(A)
Section 523(a)(2)(A) applies when debt is obtained by “false pretenses,
a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the

14. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2012).
15. Discharge, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
16. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Discharge in Bankruptcy - Bankruptcy Basics,

http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/discharge-bankruptcybankruptcy-basics (last visited Sept. 17, 2018).
17. See id.
18. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) (2012).
19. See In re Appling, 848 F.3d 953, 957 (11th Cir. 2017).
20. See In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2002).
21. See id.
22. See id.
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debtor’s financial condition.” 23 In Field v. Mans, the Supreme Court
resolved the issue of what level of reliance a creditor is required to
demonstrate under § 523(a)(2)(A). 24 In Field, the Fields sold real estate to a
corporation controlled by Mans, who contributed $275,000 to the purchase
and personally guaranteed a promissory note for $187,500. 25 The mortgage
deed contained a clause that required the Fields’ consent if there was any
conveyance of the property during the period of “secured indebtedness;”
otherwise, the unpaid balance would become payable upon an unauthorized
sale. 26 Mans’ corporation conveyed the property without the Fields’
consent. 27 Mans then wrote a letter asking the Fields for a waiver of their
rights under the clause so that he may avoid claims if he wished to add a
principal to his land development organization. 28 The letter excluded the
fact that Mans had already conveyed the property. 29
When Mans filed for bankruptcy, the Fields argued that Mans was
liable as a guarantor due to the unauthorized conveyance and that the
promissory note payment should be exempt from discharge as a debt
resulting from fraud. 30 The bankruptcy court found that Mans’ letter
constituted false representations that the Fields had relied on; however, the
court found that the Fields did not show reasonable reliance and therefore
held Mans’ debt dischargeable. 31 On appeal, the Supreme Court held that
the level of reliance requires justifiable, but not reasonable, reliance.32 The
Supreme Court looked to the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1976) to
explain that a person may be justified in relying on a representation of fact
even though that person could have investigated the representation to
determine whether it was false. 33
In the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Congress amended the
subsection by adding the term “actual fraud.” 34 The subsection now states
that debt is not dischargeable for money, property, services, or an extension,
renewal, or refinancing of credit, if it was obtained by “false pretenses, a
false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the
debtor’s financial condition.” 35 In Husky International Electronics v. Ritz,
the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split over whether “actual fraud”

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012).
See Field v. Mans, 116 S. Ct. 437, 439 (1995).
See id.
See id.
See id. at 439–40.
See id. at 440.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 446–47.
See id. at 444.
See Husky Int’l Elec. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1586 (2016).
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012).
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required a false representation.36 Husky supplied components used in
electronic devices to Chrysalis, and Chrysalis incurred a debt to Husky of
almost $164,000. 37 When Ritz, a director of Chrysalis, filed for bankruptcy,
Husky argued that Ritz could not discharge the debt because Ritz
committed actual fraud by transferring money from Chrysalis’ funds to
other corporations Ritz owned. 38
The Supreme Court held that the term “actual fraud” does not require a
false representation, and instead, encompasses other traditional forms of
fraud, such as a fraudulent conveyance scheme. 39 The Supreme Court
considered the history of § 523(a)(2)(A) and the historical meaning of
“actual fraud” and determined that fraudulent conveyances traditionally did
not require that the debtor make a false representation to the creditor. 40 The
Supreme Court therefore concluded that false representations should not be
treated as a requirement in the context of the Bankruptcy Code. As a result,
the “decision expands the exceptions to discharge of debts in bankruptcy
available to creditors and shifts the balance between the ‘fresh start’ goal of
bankruptcy and the non-dischargeability of a debt that results from a
fraudulent conveyance or similar scheme that constitutes ‘actual fraud.’”41
C. 11 U.S.C. § 523(A)(2)(B)
Section 523(a)(2)(B) applies to written statements about the debtor’s
financial condition, where the debtor’s statement is materially false and the
debtor’s intent to deceive caused the creditor’s reasonable reliance. 42 In
1903, Congress modified the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 so that debt could not
be discharged when a debtor obtained property on credit through oral
misrepresentations—but specifically excluded written misrepresentations. 43
However, this revision had detrimental results: commercial creditors could
induce potential debtors to provide false financial statements in anticipation
of the debtor going into bankruptcy. 44
As a result, Congress amended § 523(a)(2)(B) in 1960 so that debts
incurred as a result of falsely written financial statements were not
dischargeable. 45 Nondischargeable debt refers to debt that is not released

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See Husky Int’l Elec., 136 S. Ct. at 1585.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1586.
See id. at 1590.
John C. Speer & Michael P. Kapellas, False Representations No Longer Required to Prove
“Actual Fraud” Under the Bankruptcy Code, BLOOMBERG BNA (Aug. 2, 2016),
https://www.bna.com/false-representations-no-n73014445721/.
42. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) (2012).
43. See In re Joelson, 427 F.3d 700, 708 (10th Cir. 2005).
44. See id.
45. See id.
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through bankruptcy. 46 “The legislative history shows that Congress
acknowledged that not all debt obtained by fraud, false pretenses, or false
representations should be nondischargeable. The 1960 amendment
demonstrates that Congress pushed part of the responsibility back onto the
creditor to practice due diligence when lending to debtors.” 47
Whether a statement respects the debtor’s financial condition, however,
is where the interpretation became murky and led to a split among the
circuit courts. The main problem was that the Bankruptcy Code neither
provided a definition for the phrase nor defined the term “financial
condition.” 48 As a result, courts seemingly had to frame the statute in a way
that favored either creditors or debtors.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND IN RE APPLING
A. THE MINORITY “BROAD” APPROACH
The Fourth Circuit followed what is known as the broad approach to
interpret a debtor’s financial condition under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and
(B). 49 In Engler v. Steinburg, Engler loaned Steinburg $5,500, and
Steinburg assured Engler that he would have a first priority security
interest, despite the fact that Steinburg was aware that other creditors had
superior liens. 50 Steinburg filed for bankruptcy and received an order
discharging the debt, which Engler appealed. 51 The Fourth Circuit agreed
with the bankruptcy court, which held that Steinburg’s oral representations
that he owned unencumbered property related to his financial condition. 52
The Fourth Circuit explained that although a statement about whether an
individual’s assets are encumbered is not a formal financial statement,
Congress did not write “financial statements,” in the statute. 53 Instead,
Congress referred to the broad class of “financial condition.” 54 Therefore,
when a debtor asserts that he owns property without any liens, it is a
statement respecting his financial condition, especially where it concerns
encumbered assets. 55

46. Debt, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
47. Joanna L. Radmall, Note, Dishonest Debtors and Dischargeable Debts in Bankruptcy: An

Analysis of the Circuit Split Regarding the Interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 523(A)(2)’s Respecting
the Debtor’s . . . Financial Condition, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 841, 845 (2007).
48. See In re Appling, 848 F.3d 953, 957 (11th Cir. 2017).
49. See In re Joelson, 427 F.3d at 713.
50. Engler v. Van Steinburg, 744 F.2d 1060, 1060 (4th Cir. 1984).
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 1060–61.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 1061.
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In In re Appling, the Eleventh Circuit joined the Fourth Circuit in
applying the broad interpretation approach. 56 Appling hired the law firm of
Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP to represent him in litigation. 57 When
Appling was unable to pay the legal bills, he told Lamar that he was
expecting a tax refund of around $100,000, which Appling would use to
pay the outstanding fees. 58 Lamar relied on this information and continued
to represent Appling. 59 However, when Appling submitted his tax return, he
only requested a refund of $60,718, and ultimately received a refund of
$59,851, which he did not use to pay Lamar; rather, he spent it on his own
business. 60 Although Appling obtained the refund, he told Lamar that he
had not yet received it, and Lamar again agreed to complete the litigation.61
Lamar ultimately obtained a judgment against Appling totaling
$104,179.60 for the legal fees, plus interest. 62 Shortly thereafter, Appling
filed for bankruptcy. 63 The bankruptcy court held that Appling’s debt to
Lamar was not dischargeable because of Appling’s fraudulent statement
regarding his tax refund, on which Lamar justifiably relied. 64 The district
court affirmed, reasoning that a statement regarding a single asset is not a
statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition. 65 Appling appealed
this decision to the Eleventh Circuit. 66
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of whether a statement about a
single asset can constitute a “statement respecting the debtor’s financial
condition” under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2). 67 The Eleventh Circuit discussed
the split among the circuits, that is, the Fourth Circuit’s broad
interpretation, and the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits’ narrow
interpretation of the statement. 68 Next, the Eleventh Circuit looked at the
language of the statute itself. Due to the absence of a definition of the
relevant terms, the Eleventh Circuit looked to their “ordinary, everyday
meanings” and concluded that a statement about a single asset can be a
statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition. 69
The Eleventh Circuit determined that the term “financial condition”
refers to “one’s overall financial status,” thus a statement about a single

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See In re Appling, 848 F.3d 953, 960 (11th Cir. 2017).
See id. at 955.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 956.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 955.
See id. at 957.
See id.
See id. at 957–58.
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asset relates to and impacts a debtor’s overall financial condition.70 The
court explained that this application yields a reasonable balance between
discouraging fraud and providing a debtor with a fresh start.71 According to
the Eleventh Circuit, requiring that a statement respecting the debtor’s
financial condition be in writing helps “the honest debtor prove his honesty
and the innocent creditor prove a debtor’s dishonesty.” 72 The Eleventh
Circuit ultimately held that, because a statement about a single asset can be
a statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition, and because
Appling’s statements were not in writing, Appling’s debt was
dischargeable. 73
Certain bankruptcy courts followed this broad approach. 74 In In re
Jacobs, the Bankruptcy Court in the Eastern District of Michigan stated that
broad interpretation of the statute “is the better reading of the actual words
used in the statute.” 75 The bankruptcy court reasoned that exceptions to
discharge should be construed against the creditor and therefore this
approach benefits the debtor. 76 The bankruptcy court provided two
explanations of how this approach works against the creditors: (1) the broad
interpretation requires that statements be in writing; and (2) subsection B
involves a higher standard of reliance (requiring reasonable reliance) than
subsection A (requiring justifiable reliance). 77
B. THE MAJORITY “NARROW” APPROACH
The Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits followed a narrow approach to
interpret a debtor’s financial condition. 78 These circuits held that “a
statement about a single asset does not respect a debtor’s financial condition
because it ‘says nothing about the overall financial condition of the person
making the representation or the ability to repay debt.’” 79
In In re Bandi, the Fifth Circuit reviewed a case involving debtors who,
in seeking a loan, provided the creditor with a fraudulent list of accounts
receivable and falsely represented that they owned several properties. 80 The
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 958.
See id. at 960.
Id.
See id. at 961.
See generally In re Carless, No. 10-42988 (DHS), 2012 WL 32700, at *3–4 (D.N.J. Jan. 6,
2012) (holding that the failure to disclose a loan falls within the broad view of the term “financial
condition”); In re Aman, 492 B.R. 550, 565 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010) (holding that a debtor’s
assertion that he owns property free and clear of liens is a statement respecting his financial
condition); In re Hambley 329 B.R. 382, 399 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that a statement
concerning the ownership of assets qualifies as a statement regarding financial condition).
75. In re Jacobs, 460 B.R. 149, 155 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2011).
76. See id. at 155–56.
77. See id. at 156.
78. See In re Appling, 848 F.3d 953, 957 (11th Cir. 2017).
79. Id.
80. In re Bandi, 683 F.3d 671, 673 (5th Cir. 2012).
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debtors, who personally guaranteed the loan, then filed for bankruptcy. 81
The Fifth Circuit, in interpreting a debtor’s financial condition, determined
that the phrase was meant to reflect the terms as understood in their
commercial usage. 82 As a result, the court concluded that “financial
condition” refers to the “overall financial condition of an entity or
individual, that is, the overall value of property and income as compared to
debt and liabilities.” 83 The court held that a statement that someone owns a
specific piece of property neither pertains to the overall financial condition
of the person who is making the statement nor to their ability to repay
debt. 84 The court explained that in instances where the property was
encumbered or the debtor’s liabilities exceeded the value of the property, a
statement about merely owning the property would not reveal that person’s
financial condition. 85
In the Eighth Circuit case In re Lauer, Lauer and Graves were general
partners of a limited partnership. 86 Lauer and Graves purchased the interests
of the limited partners, the Nangles, but promised them that the remainder
of the payments were secured by the partnership’s joint venture with a
nursing home. 87 However, Lauer and Graves did not disclose to the Nangles
that the nursing home had been sold. 88 Lauer argued that the fraud fell
within subsection B rather than A, because the failure to disclose the sale of
the nursing home was a statement respecting his financial condition. 89 The
Eighth Circuit rejected this argument, noting that subsection B is the more
specific provision, aimed at preventing both debtors and creditors from
misusing financial statements. 90 The court therefore held that the fraud
liability is not dischargeable because Lauer and Graves committed common
law fraud by concealing the partnership’s assets in order to encourage the
limited partners to sell their interests. 91
In the Tenth Circuit case, In re Joelson, Cadwell was a single, retired
man who met Joelson at a café where Joelson was working as a waitress. 92
Joelson asked Cadwell for a loan of over $50,000 to avoid foreclosure of
her home in Arizona. 93 Joelson told Cadwell that she would pay him back
once her brother, who was to loan her the funds, gave her the money. 94
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See id.
See id. at 676.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See In re Lauer, 371 F.3d 406, 408–09 (8th Cir. 2004).
See id. at 409.
See id.
See id. at 413.
See id.
See id. at 413–14.
In re Joelson, 427 F.3d 700, 703 (10th Cir. 2005).
See id.
See id.
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Joelson also informed Cadwell that she owned two homes, a motel, and
some antique vehicles in Wyoming, which she took Cadwell to see.95
Cadwell then mortgaged his home and borrowed the money; Joelson gave
him a promissory note in return. 96 Joelson did not repay the loan and argued
that the money Cadwell gave to her for the property was a gift.97 The Tenth
Circuit concluded that the strict interpretation of the phrase “respecting the
debtor’s financial condition” “is the most consistent with the text and
structure of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress’s intent as expressed in the
legislative history of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B), and case law.” 98
The Tenth Circuit looked to the definition of “insolvent” to assist in
interpreting the phrase and concluded that the phrase should be limited to
statements referring to a debtor’s overall financial net worth or financial
condition. 99 The court explained that it is much more difficult to portray
one’s overall financial position in oral communication. 100 Therefore, “it is
logical to give more leeway . . . to a debtor who errs in stating his or her
overall position orally, since it is more likely that he or she may have made
a mistake inadvertently.” 101
The Tenth Circuit went on to say that the trend among the courts
supports a strict interpretation and summarizes four arguments made in
previous cases: (1) the normal commercial meaning and usage of
“statement” and “financial conditions” represents a person’s overall net
worth or overall ability to generate income; (2) legislative history
demonstrates the statute’s application to the false financial statement; (3)
strict interpretation promotes better bankruptcy policy; and (4) strict
interpretation is consistent with the purpose of protecting debtors from poor
lending practices. 102
The Tenth Circuit held that a statement respecting one’s financial
condition is one that “present[s] a picture of the debtor’s overall financial
health” similar to a balance sheet, income statement, statement of changes
in financial position, or income and debt statement.103 Applying the facts to
the case, the court determined that Joelson’s representations were not
statements respecting her financial condition, and therefore the loan is not
dischargeable under subsection (A). 104

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 706.
See id. at 707.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 712.
Id. at 714.
See id. at 715.
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Some bankruptcy courts also followed the narrow approach. 105 In In re
Belice, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit determined that
In re Joelson provided a good framework to analyze the correct legal
standard for interpreting the phrase “respecting the debtor’s financial
condition.” 106 In In re Feldman, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania also noted In re Joelson’s “thorough analysis” and
opted to follow the majority position of the strict reading of the phrase. 107
III. THE SUPREME COURT RESOLVES THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
In April 2017, the petitioner in In re Appling petitioned for a writ of
certiorari. 108 It was essential that the Supreme Court grant certiorari to
resolve the split among the circuit courts in interpreting the statute. As the
petition stated, “particularly given the importance of uniformity in
bankruptcy, there is no reason why [the U.S. Supreme Court] should
tolerate the result where a common class of debts is dischargeable in some
parts of the country but not others.” 109 The petition also claimed that
solution of this conflict was necessary for the proper administration of the
bankruptcy system. 110
Additionally, the need to resolve the circuit split was significant
because the open-ended interpretation of the discharge exception statute
essentially forced the courts to choose between construing the phrase in
favor of a debtor or creditor. In doing so, the courts appeared to arbitrarily
pick which subsection of the Bankruptcy Code to apply based on policy, but
did so under the guise of textual structure and legislative history. The Tenth
Circuit in In re Joelson explained that a strict reading is more consistent
with the structure of the statute based on the impacts each section has on
debtors and creditors. 111 This method of adjudicating disputes in bankruptcy
law was far too subjective; courts should not resolve ambiguity in a statute
by picking sides. As the Eleventh Circuit stated, “a distaste for dishonest
debtors does not empower judges to disregard the text of the statute.” 112 In
105. See generally In re Banayan 468 B.R. 542, 576 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that the
Tenth Circuit’s strict interpretation is logical and correct); In re Campbell, 448 B.R. 876, 886
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2011) (holding that the In re Bandi court’s strict interpretation of the phrase is
correct and to do otherwise could make every fraudulent statement by a debtor respect the debtor’s
financial condition and render § 523(a)(2)(A) a “virtual nullity”).
106. See In re Belice, 461 B.R. 564, 574 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011).
107. See In re Feldman, 500 B.R. 431, 437 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2013).
108. See In re Appling, 848 F.3d 953 (11th Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed, 2017 WL
1338561, at *1 (U.S. Apr. 11, 2017).
109. Id. at *4.
110. See id. at *16.
111. See In re Joelson, 427 F.3d 700, 707 (10th Cir. 2005).
112. In re Appling, 848 F.3d 953, 960 (11th Cir. 2017).
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other words, a court should not ignore the proper canons of construction in
order to obtain an outcome it believes is equitable.
B. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The U.S. Supreme Court resolved the circuit split on June 4, 2018 in
Lamar v Appling. 113 In a unanimous decision in favor of Appling, the
Supreme Court held that a statement regarding a specific asset can be a
“statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition” under § 523(a)(2)(B)
of the Bankruptcy Code. 114
The Supreme Court began its inquiry by examining the language of the
statute, focusing on the phrase “statement respecting the debtor’s financial
condition” with emphasis on the word “respecting.” 115 The ordinary
meaning of “‘respecting’ includes: in view of: considering; with regard or
relation to: regarding; concerning.” 116 Lamar argued that when used in this
context, “respecting” has a limited meaning. Lamar asserted that
“respecting” refers to a statement that is about, or makes reference to, the
debtor’s overall financial state such as a detailed financial statement listing
one’s assets and liabilities. 117 However, the Supreme Court rejected this
argument, explaining that “respecting” can be defined more broadly. 118 As a
result, the Supreme Court concluded that a statement is respecting a
debtor’s financial condition if it directly relates to or impacts the debtor’s
overall financial status, which includes a single asset. 119
The Supreme Court also noted that following Lamar’s argument would
lead to “inexplicably bizarre” results. 120 Under Lamar’s logic, when the
misrepresentation about a single asset is made in a formal financial
statement, it would trigger heightened non-dischargeability requirements;
yet, when the misrepresentation is made more generally (i.e., stating “I am
above water”), it would not. The Supreme Court was doubtful that Congress
would condition the ability to discharge a debt on “the superficial
packaging of a statement rather than its substantive content.” 121
Next, the Supreme Court considered the statutory history of the phrase,
“statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition,” which has its
origins in a provision of a 1926 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act of
1898. 122 The Supreme Court explained how Congress retained the phrase
when amending the provision in a 1960 amendment and again when it
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 138 S. Ct. 1752, 1758 (2018).
See id. at 1764.
See id. at 1759.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1759–60.
See id. at 1761.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1762.
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rewrote the provision as the current § 523(a)(2)(B). 123 The Supreme Court
observed that the phrase established a longstanding judicial interpretation
that Congress was aware of when using similar language in § 523(a)(2) and
therefore Congress intended for the phrase to maintain its meaning. 124
Lamar argued that the broad interpretation of the phrase would
undermine the purpose of § 523(a)(2) in two ways. 125 First, Lamar asserted
that Appling’s construal would be far too broad and would leave little to be
covered under § 523(a)(2)(A). 126 The Supreme Court rejected this argument
and pointed to the fact that courts (including the Supreme Court) have
rendered decisions based on the applicability of § 523(a)(2)(A). 127 The
subsection has also been applied to debt arising from fraudulent schemes
and misrepresentations about the value of goods, property, and services. 128
Second, Lamar contended that the broad interpretation is inconsistent
with the principle of the Bankruptcy Code that aims to provide relief to the
honest but unfortunate debtor because it enables fraudsters to take
advantage of innocent victims by orally lying about their financial
conditions to have their debt discharged. 129 The Supreme Court disagreed,
explaining that the heightened requirements reflect Congress’s intent to
balance the potential exploitation of statements respecting the debtor’s
financial condition by both debtors and creditors. 130 The Supreme Court
cited the House Report on the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which
described how consumer finance companies would cause their borrowers to
falsify information about their debts in order to use those statements as the
basis for non-dischargeability. 131 The Supreme Court referred to its decision
in Field, where it explained that the heightened requirements under §
523(a)(2)(B) were intended to address creditor abuse. 132 According to the
Supreme Court, Lamar’s interpretation would leave the subsection “subject
to manipulation by creditors.” 133
The Supreme Court dismissed the notion of the defenseless creditor.
The Supreme Court explained that creditors are still protected under the
subsection so long as they insist that the representations respecting the
debtor’s financial condition are in writing. Moreover, creditors will even
benefit because the writing requirement can “foster accuracy at the outset of

123.
124.
125.
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127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
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See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1763.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1763–64.
See id. at 1763–64 (citing Field v. Mans, 116 S. Ct. 437, 447 (1995)).
Appling, 138 S. Ct. at 1764.
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a transaction, reduce the incidence of fraud, and facilitate the more
predictable, fair, and efficient resolution of any subsequent dispute.” 134
IV. THE BROAD INTERPRETATION IS PROPER, BUT THE
OUTCOME IS FLAWED
A. THE BROAD INTERPRETATION IS PROPER
The Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the phrase “respecting the
debtor’s financial condition” based only on the text, structure, and
legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code is persuasive. As the Eleventh
Circuit convincingly pointed out, “if the statute applied only to statements
that expressed a debtor’s overall financial condition, Congress could have
said so.” 135 It also considered the legislative history, where the term
“financial statement” was often used in place of “statement respecting the
financial condition.” 136 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that because
“financial statement” has an established and technical meaning, it would
follow that Congress would have used that term instead. 137 The definition of
financial statement would not include a statement about a single asset: “[a]
balance sheet, income statement, or annual report that summarizes an
individual’s or organization’s financial condition on a specified date or for a
specified period by reporting assets and liabilities.” 138 However, Congress
chose to use the term “statement.” 139
The Fourth Circuit made this same argument, reasoning that Congress
did not “speak in terms of financial statements” but rather, it referred to the
broad category of statements that respect a debtor’s financial condition. 140
Again, using the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning, the fact that Congress chose
to use the general term “financial condition” instead of the more specific
term “financial statement” supports the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion.
In contrast, those who argued that the legislative intent demonstrates the
need for a strict interpretation point to Representative Don Edwards’
comments in the House Report. 141 In the September 28, 1978 House Report,
Representative Edwards stated that a debt “obtained by a false financial
statement within the terms of [§] 523(a)(2) is nondischargeable.” 142
Although this is good evidence of the legislative intent, it is not absolute
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
In re Appling, 848 F.3d 953, 958 (11th Cir. 2017).
See id. at 959.
See id.
Id. (quoting Financial Statement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)).
See id.
Engler v. Van Steinburg, 744 F.2d 1060, 1060–61 (4th Cir. 1984).
See Mallory Velten, Comment, Debtors as Predators: The Proper Interpretation of a
Statement Respecting the Debtor’s . . . Financial Condition” in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B),
30 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 583, 608 (2014).
142. Id. (citing 124 CONG. REC. H11, 089 at 32,399 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards)).
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proof that Congress intended the phrase to protect debtors over creditors.
Moreover, the fact that Congress chose not to use that term and has not
since amended the Bankruptcy Code to reflect that definition pushes the
inquiry in favor of a broad interpretation.
B. THE BROAD INTERPRETATION LEADS TO NEGATIVE POLICY
IMPLICATIONS
Although the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation of the phrase is
compelling, the
decision gives little consideration to the negative policy implications
that may result. A similar sentiment was felt in the aftermath of In re
Appling, where a business law professor told Bloomberg Law that the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision “seems to go long on statutory interpretation
and a little bit short on policy.” 143
When a statute is unclear, courts may consider public policy
implications.144 In Appling, Lamar raised two important and logical policy
arguments to which Supreme Court did not give sufficient attention in its
nine-page opinion. First, Lamar argued that the broad construction of §
523(a)(2)(B) would render § 523(a)(2)(A) useless. 145 The Supreme Court
relied on the fact that prior court decisions have considered the application
of subsection A when the phrase was interpreted to include a statement
about a single asset. 146 Notably, the Supreme Court does not provide any
reference or citations to these cases. The Supreme Court also indicated that
subsection A applies to debts that arise from forms of fraud that do not
require a false representation, as demonstrated in Husky. 147 Yet, the
question in Husky dealt only with whether actual fraud required a false
representation; it did not address the other requirement of subsection A at
issue: that the statement not be respecting the debtor’s financial condition.
The Supreme Court’s holding sets a risky precedent where almost anything
can constitute a statement about a single asset. It is difficult to see how
subsection A would apply once a statement is found to be respecting the
debtor’s financial condition.
Second, Lamar argued that the strict interpretation enables fraudsters to
take advantage of innocent victims by orally lying about their financial
condition, then having their debt discharged. 148 The Supreme Court rejected
this argument, explaining that the heightened requirements were not
143. Diane Davis, Justices Weigh Bankruptcy Fallout of Unkept Pledge to Pay Lawyers,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Apr. 12, 2018), https://biglawbusiness.com/justices-weigh-bankruptcy-falloutof-unkept-pledge-to-pay-lawyers/.
144. See Velten, supra note 141, at 609 (citing 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 68 (2014)).
145. Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 138 S. Ct. 1752, 1763 (2018).
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 1763–64.
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intended as a shield for dishonest debtors; rather, Congress sought to
address creditor abuse from consumer finance companies. 149 The Supreme
Court primarily focused on an issue faced by the consumer finance industry
in the 1970s to justify its position. In doing so, the Supreme Court focused
too much on the need to protect the honest debtor, that it completely
ignored the dishonest debtor. Allowing a dishonest debtor to receive a
discharge of debt “certainly seems to frustrate a ‘primary purpose’ of the
Bankruptcy Act to provide relief to only the ‘honest debtor.’” 150 A broad
reading of the phrase creates an opportunity for debtors to take advantage of
a “giant fraud loophole.” 151 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court quickly
dismissed Lamar’s fear of debtor abuse, even as the situation played out
right in front of it. The facts in Appling are neither unique nor exceptional;
they portray a common story that results in a dishonest debtor successfully
gaming the system.
The Supreme Court rebuffs the notion of a defenseless creditor,
because, after all, creditors can still insist on getting representations in
writing. 152 The requirement that representations respecting the debtor’s
financial condition be made in writing can be useful. As noted previously,
writings can “foster accuracy at the outset of a transaction, reduce the
incidence of fraud, and facilitate the more predictable, fair, and efficient
resolution of any subsequent dispute.” 153 Aside from reducing incidents of
fraud, the Eleventh Circuit further noted that the writing requirement
“promotes accuracy and predictability in bankruptcy disputes that often take
places years after the facts arose.” 154
Yet, the defenseless creditor is not some mythical character and the
writing requirement is certainly vulnerable to exploitation. “This is a typical
practice in a Chase Manhattan office, but not a retiree’s living room. Those
parties who regularly deal in credit or who participate in significant
transactions are more likely to protect themselves with a written
document.” 155 Therefore, unsophisticated parties who may not be savvy
enough to establish safeguards against dishonest debtors are left to fend for
themselves. Just because the parties may lack the legal knowledge to
adequately protect themselves does not mean they are risking an
insignificant sum of money. In fact, the loan in In re Joelson totaled
$50,000. 156 Furthermore, the Supreme Court does not consider the small
businesses that rely on oral agreements from customers. An amicus brief
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

See id. at 1763.
In re Appling, 848 F.3d 953, 961 (11th Cir. 2017) (Rosenbaum, J., concurring).
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filed by the National Federation of Independent Small Business Legal
Center argued that the broad interpretation would “create a correspondingly
vast new paperwork mandate that small businesses could not hope to
satisfy.” 157
Another policy argument that seemingly favors the Supreme Court’s
broad interpretation is the reasonableness of creditors to perform due
diligence. Advocates of the broad approach believe that it is reasonable to
require creditors to perform due diligence in order to confirm that the
debtor’s statements are indeed truthful. 158 Perhaps Congress did not want to
protect those creditors who fail to exercise due diligence. If that is the case,
then the Supreme Court’s interpretation would align with Congress’s intent
by punishing careless creditors. 159 However, this harsh punishment is
irrational because “the failure of a creditor to perform due diligence does
not justify the actions of the debtor who commits fraud.” 160 As interpreted
by the Supreme Court, subsection B acts as more of a punishment to
creditors rather than a way to help them recover money that is owed to
them.
Currently, all a potential debtor must do to take advantage of this
loophole is borrow however much money he sees fit, orally promise the
creditor he will pay the creditor back based on a fraudulent statement
relating to his financial condition, and then file for bankruptcy. In order to
discourage creditors from abusing the Bankruptcy Code, Congress has now
effectively provided a way for debtors to exploit it. The Supreme Court’s
interpretation allows dishonest debtors to be rewarded for their fraudulent
oral misrepresentations. Although creditors’ abuse of the exceptions to
discharge provided the catalyst to divide section (a)(2) into two subsections,
in doing so, the heightened requirements for nondischargeability under §
523(a)(2)(B) led to the debtors’ abuse of those exceptions.
IV. THE SOLUTION
Although the Supreme Court’s construal of a statement respecting a
debtor’s financial condition is proper when looking only at its text and
legislative history, the broad interpretation will yield inequitable results.161
157. Brief of Amicus Curiae National Federation of Independent Business Small Business
Legal Center in Support of Petitioner at 12–13, Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 138 S.
Ct. 1752 (2018) (No. 16-1215), 2018 WL 1202842.
158. See Radmall, supra note 47, at 859.
159. See Velten, supra note 141, at 613.
160. Id. at 614.
161. See generally In re Appling, 848 F.3d at 957–58 (holding that the debt was not exempt
from discharge because the debtor’s statements were not in writing, even after finding that the
debtor’s false statements to the creditor regarding an anticipated income tax refund were
statements respecting the debtor’s financial condition); Engler v. Van Steinburg, 744 F.2d 1060,
1060–61 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding that a “debtor’s assertion that he owns certain property free and
clear of other liens is a statement respecting his financial condition”).
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In response to the Eleventh Circuit’s In re Appling decision, Bloomberg
published an article titled, “Lawyers Lose $100,000 Award Despite
Bankrupt Client’s Lie.” 162 Then, in response to the Supreme Court’s
affirmation of In re Appling, Lexology published an article titled, “The
Supreme Court Extends Bankruptcy Protections To Even Dishonest
Debtors.” 163 The titles chosen for these articles exemplify how the real-life
application of the broad interpretation is difficult to reconcile and is
presumably what those courts employing strict interpretation were seeking
to avoid.
The negative policy implications demonstrate the need for a solution.
Instead of applying a textualist approach to interpreting the Bankruptcy
Code, the Supreme Court should consider other factors, such as the
sufficiency and intent of the oral statements, the amount of money a
creditor is owed, and the sophistication of the parties.
A. THE MODIFIED EXPANSIVE APPROACH
A proposed solution is following what is known as the modified
expansive view. 164 In In re Ransford, the Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Massachusetts faced the problem of agreeing with both the broad and
narrow approaches. 165 As a result, the court adopted an approach that
examined both the nature of the statement and the purpose of the
statement. 166 The bankruptcy court explained that by focusing on the
purpose of the statement, it could distinguish between statements that
involve a debtor’s financial condition from “one that does so only
incidentally.” 167
In In re Ransford, Ransford, Sr. executed a deed conveying record title
to a valuable piece of property on a farm to his son, Ransford, Jr. 168
Ransford, Jr. then executed a deed conveying the property back to his
father, however this second deed was not recorded with the Registry of
Deeds. 169 Ransford, Sr. told the plaintiffs that Ransford, Jr. owned the
farm. 170 The plaintiffs sought to sell their business to Ransford, Jr. and
during their conversations, the parties discussed Ransford, Jr.’s ownership
162. Diane Davis, Lawyers Lose $100,000 Award Despite Bankruptcy Client’s Lie,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.bna.com/lawyers-lose-100000-n57982084178/.
163. Mark A. Salzberg, The Supreme Court Extends Bankruptcy Protections To Even Dishonest
Debtors, LEXOLOGY (June 5, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8140b66436bd-4ae0-9815-75e1954a3cfc.
164. See In re Redburn, 202 B.R. 917, 926–929 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1996) (discussing the
modified expansive view of the phrase).
165. See In re Ransford, 202 B.R. 1, 4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996).
166. See id.
167. See id. at 5.
168. See id. at 2.
169. See id.
170. See id.
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of the farm. 171 The plaintiffs and Ransford, Jr. signed a purchase and sale
agreement whereby the plaintiffs transferred the business to Ransford, Jr. in
exchange for a promissory note of $140,000.172 On the date of execution,
the plaintiffs were concerned about not obtaining a mortgage on the farm as
collateral but were ultimately dissuaded from doing so by their attorney
who reassured the plaintiffs that a mortgage was unnecessary due to the
farm’s great value. 173 Throughout the negotiations, Ransford, Jr. never
mentioned the second deed. 174 When Ransford, Jr. failed to make all the
payments, the plaintiffs noticed the deficiency and filed an action against
Ransford, Jr. seeking judgment on the promissory note and conveyance of
the farm from Ransford, Sr. to Ransford, Jr. 175 Within a month, Ransford,
Jr. filed for bankruptcy. 176
In In re Ransford, one of the statements at issue involved the
defendant’s oral statement that he owned a farm. 177 The court determined
that the purpose of the oral statements was to assure the plaintiffs that if
their business failed, the debtors owned another asset that could satisfy his
obligation. 178 Therefore, the oral statements were made to establish the
debtor’s financial condition. 179 However, because the statements were not
in writing, subsection B did not apply. 180
This modified expansive approach provides a good method of analysis
because it deters courts from favoring creditors or debtors and instead,
shifts the focus to the purpose of the statements. 181 “The court can achieve
results that are perhaps more equitable than nearly always deciding in favor
of the debtors (broad view) or in favor of the creditors (narrow view). The
modified expansive view permits courts to consider the sophistication of the
parties and their intentions.” 182 If the Supreme Court had applied the
modified expansive approach to In re Appling, it would likely have found
that Appling’s statements about his tax refund were intended to assure
Lamar that he could pay for the legal services. Therefore, the oral
statements were seemingly made by Appling to demonstrate his financial
condition.
However, this still does not fully address the problem: the debtor in In
re Ransford was found to have made a misrepresentation regarding his
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
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financial condition; but because of the loophole requiring the statement to
be in writing, he was able to have his debt discharged. 183 Similarly, under
the modified expansive analysis of In re Appling, the result would be the
same. Critics of the modified-expansive view argue that this view is
essentially equivalent to the broad view because both consider the
materiality of the statement. 184 This argument has merit given how In re
Ransford and In re Appling would produce the same result under either
approach.
B. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD LOOK AT THE TOTALITY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES
The ability to apply § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B) should not depend solely on
whether a statement is oral or written. Instead, the Supreme Court should
have looked at the totality of the circumstances. In doing so, it would have
the discretion to grant an exception to discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A) and
(B) by considering a number of factors. The Supreme Court should consider
the following: (1) the sufficiency and intent of the oral statements; (2) the
amount of money a creditor is owed; and (3) the sophistication of the
parties.
The Supreme Court should acknowledge the sufficiency and intent of
the oral statements because the Bankruptcy Code’s application is
counterintuitive: a court finds a debtor to have purposely made a statement
about his financial condition to induce a creditor, yet the creditor is unable
to benefit because of a mere technicality. In the case of In re Appling, there
was enough evidence of the oral conversations between Appling and Lamar
for the bankruptcy court to determine that the debtor made fraudulent
statements. 185 Whether or not Appling actually made the false
representations about his ability to pay was never at issue and seemed to be
a given throughout the case’s subsequent history.
In cases like In re Appling—where there are no questions of fact as to
the oral statements—the justification to require the statement be in writing
is moot because the evidence is undisputed. The Tenth Circuit in In re
Joelson raised a valid point when it discussed how, during an oral
conversation, an individual can easily make a mistake when listing his
assets and liabilities. 186 In a situation where a debtor, in good faith, erred in
describing his financial condition, the Supreme Court could use its
discretion to apply the writing requirement. This would incorporate the
methodology behind the modified expansive view, which relies on the
purpose of the statements. 187
183.
184.
185.
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187.
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The Supreme Court should also consider the amount of money the
creditor is owed. This brings to mind the law of unjust enrichment. Under
the concept of unjust enrichment, “if benefits have been received and
retained under such circumstance that it would be inequitable and
unconscionable to permit the party receiving them to avoid payment
therefore, the law requires the party receiving the benefits to pay their
reasonable value.” 188 Justice Cardozo, in discussing unjust enrichment,
stated that the defendant must return any benefit “received in such
circumstances that the possessor will give offense to equity and good
conscience if permitted to retain it.” 189
This is viewed as a broad definition with both advantages and
disadvantages. 190 The problem with this interpretation is that it induces
juries to question the fairness of transactions covered by other rules of
law. 191 Yet, it also provides courts with flexibility to “deal with unjust
enrichment that falls between the cracks of existing rules, whether from
changing social norms, the cleverness of subtle wrongdoers, or the human
tendency to neglect legal requirements in conducting personal
relationships.” 192 Effectively, unjust enrichment addresses the problem of
debtors who seek to game the system. The doctrine of unjust enrichment
plays a major role in analyzing the broad interpretation’s effects, where
dishonest debtors are capable of obtaining a windfall.
In applying the doctrine of unjust enrichment to Appling, Appling
reaped the benefit of receiving free legal services. Appling was not a
situation where the parties misunderstood what the other wanted in reaching
an agreement. Indeed, both parties were aware of the terms: Lamar would
provide legal services and Appling would pay for those services. 193 There
was a mutual understanding and therefore a meeting of the minds; only, one
party clearly did not intend on delivering his end of the bargain. 194 Lamar
obtained a judgment against Appling for $104,179.60. 195 Therefore, where
the amount of money involved is significant, courts should take extra care
to make sure the dishonest debtor is not receiving a substantial benefit at the
creditor’s considerable expense.
In Appling, Lamar’s remedy should have been restitution. “If a
deliberate breach of contract results in profit to the defaulting promisor and
188. Realmark Devs., Inc. v. Ranson, 542 S.E.2d 880, 884–85 (W. Va. 2000).
189. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301, 309 (1935).
190. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 625

(4th ed. 2010).
191. See id.
192. Id. at 625–26.
193. See In re Appling, 848 F.3d 953, 955 (11th Cir. 2017).
194. See id. (noting that “[w]hen Appling and his wife submitted their tax return, they requested
a refund of only $60,718 and received a refund of $59,851 in October. The Applings spent this
money on their business. They did not pay Lamar”).
195. See id. at 956.
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the available damage remedy affords inadequate protection to the
promisee’s contractual entitlement, the promisee has a claim to restitution
of the profit realized by the promisor as a result of the breach.” 196 In re
Appling appeared to be an intentional breach of contract and Lamar did not
have sufficient protection from a damages remedy because the debt was
discharged. 197 Typically, when the benefit that was conferred was just
money, the promisor will simply be required to give the money back to the
promisee. 198 Although valuation problems may arise, Lamar already
received a judgment for a specified amount. 199 Therefore, Lamar should be
entitled to receive his $104,179.60 from Appling under the concept of
unjust enrichment.
Finally, the Supreme Court should consider the sophistication of the
parties. As mentioned above, unsophisticated parties may not have the
foresight to insist that promises be in writing. People or entities with legal
knowledge may be more adept at both requesting and providing statements
respecting the financial condition. However, for people who lack this
information, a seemingly ordinary transaction can become quite
burdensome. An average person may ask to borrow money from friends or
family for a variety of reasons. Often, that layperson turned creditor does
not have the sophistication to request that when the debtor makes a
statement regarding its financial condition, it be in writing. Instead of a
written contract, the average person typically relies on the word of his
friend or family that he will be repaid. Yet, the Bankruptcy Code currently
provides debtors an advantage over trusting, inexperienced creditors. One
suggestion is that “the statute could define less sophisticated creditors by
creating a bright-line rule based upon the number of loans a creditor makes
per year or the amount of the loan.” 200 This would avoid the element
regarding the sophistication of the parties from becoming overly subjective.
CONCLUSION
The ambiguity in the term “a statement respecting the financial
condition” in § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B) resulted in a circuit split. The Supreme
Court resolved this split by adopting the broad approach, wherein the
phrase includes communication about any single asset or liability. 201 The
Supreme Court’s analysis was based on the text, structure, and legislative
196. Laycock, supra note 190, at 685 (citing Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment § 39(1) (2011)).
197. See In re Appling, 848 F.3d at 961.
198. See Blue Cross Health Servs., Inc. v. Sauer, 800 S.W.2d 72, 76 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)
(noting that “[t]he appropriate action when one party has been unjustly enriched through the
mistaken payment of money by the other party is an action at law for money had and received”).
199. See In re Appling, 848 F.3d at 956.
200. See Radmall, supra note 47, at 857.
201. See Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 138 S. Ct. 1752, 1759 (2018).
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history of the phrase. However, the broad interpretation results in unsound
public policy because it enables a dishonest debtor to discharge his debt and
leaves the honest creditor without any restitution. Therefore, the writing
requirement in subsection B should be more lenient and allow courts to
exercise their discretion based on the sufficiency and purpose of the
debtor’s oral statements, amount of money owed, and sophistication of the
parties. Determining whether an exception to discharge exists on a case-bycase basis will allow for more equitable results.
Torie Levine *

* B.S., Indiana University, 2012; J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2019. Thank
you to the hard-working and dedicated staff and editors of the Brooklyn Journal of
Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law with their help in preparing this Note for
publication.

